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Causal Models on Probability Spaces
Irineo Cabreros∗ and John D. Storey†
Abstract
We describe the interface between measure theoretic probability and causal infer-
ence by constructing causal models on probability spaces within the potential outcomes
framework. We find that measure theory provides a precise and instructive language
for causality and that consideration of the probability spaces underlying causal mod-
els offers clarity into central concepts of causal inference. By closely studying simple,
instructive examples, we demonstrate insights into causal effects, causal interactions,
matching procedures, and randomization. Additionally, we introduce a simple tech-
nique for visualizing causal models on probability spaces that is useful both for gen-
erating examples and developing causal intuition. Finally, we provide an axiomatic
framework for causality and make initial steps towards a formal theory of general
causal models.
1 Introduction
The goal of causal inference is to understand mechanistic relationships between random
variables. Beyond simply observing that smokers have a higher rate of lung cancer than
non-smokers, for instance, causal inference aims to determine whether lung cancer is a down-
stream effect of the act of smoking. As random variables are probabilistic objects, probability
theory is intrinsic to causality.
Despite the centrality of probability in causal inference, the precise relationship between
the two has historically been contested. For instance, it has long been emphasized that
probabilistic relationships often have no causal interpretation, as any discussion of causality
is quick to remark that “correlation is not causation.” The earliest recorded distinctions
between dependence and causation predate the introduction of the correlation coefficient
itself. Fechner, who in 1851 differentiated between a “causal dependency” and a “functional
relationship” in his work on mathematical psychology [1], is possibly the first to articulate
this distinction [2].
In contrast, Karl Pearson, the eponym of the Pearson correlation, held that correlation
subsumed causation. In his influential book The Grammar of Science [3], Pearson states:
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It is this conception of correlation between two occurrences embracing all rela-
tionships from absolute independence to complete dependence, which is the wider
category by which we have to replace the old idea of causation.
To Pearson, causation was simply perfect co-occurance: a correlation coefficient of exactly
±1 [4]. Notions of causality beyond probabilistic correlation, Pearson argued, were outside
the realm of scientific inquiry [5].
Pearson’s view of causality is far from the main formulations of causality today. Under
our modern understanding of causality, one can easily construct examples in which X and
Y have correlation 1, however neither X is causal for Y nor Y is causal for X . Both X
and Y may be the result of some common confounding cause, for instance. Likewise, one
can construct examples of systems in which the observed correlation between X and Y is 0,
however X is causal for Y . X may be confounded with a third variable Z, which masks the
effect of X on Y in the population. Causality and correlation are now viewed as conceptually
distinct phenomena.
The earliest attempts to define causality in a manner that resembles our current con-
ception avoided probabilistic language altogether. A representative example of an early
definition of causality, typically credited to Marshall [6] though likely of earlier origins [7], is
paraphrased as follows.
Definition 1 (Early notion of causality (Ceteris Paribus)). X is said to be causal for Y if
directly manipulating the value of X, keeping everything else unchanged, changes the value
of Y .
While Definition 1 is intuitively appealing—providing a practical description of causality
for controlled laboratory settings—it clearly lacks mathematical rigor. In particular, it is
unclear how to translate the idea of a “direct manipulation” into probabilistic language.
Viewed within the measure theoretic framework of probability, Definition 1 is particularly
problematic. A pair of random variables X and Y defined on the same probability space
(Ω,F , P ) are determined by a common source of randomness: the selection of a random out-
come ω ∈ Ω. Thus, it is not at all clear why “directly” manipulating the value of X would
have an impact on Y . Classical probability allows random variables to convey information
about each other, but only through the symmetric notion of probabilistic dependence. Con-
versely, causal inference hopes to distinguish directionality; the statement “smoking causes
lung cancer” is distinct from the statement “lung cancer causes smoking.” Where causal
inference seeks to draw arrows between random variables (X → Y ), classical probability
treats X and Y symmetrically in that both are functions of a single random outcome, X(ω)
and Y (ω).
The central aim of this work is to clearly explain how causal models can be constructed
within the measure theoretic framework of classical probability theory. We take as our
starting point the Neyman-Rubin model (NRM) of potential outcomes [8, 9, 10], and describe
the structure of the probability space on which these potential outcomes are defined. From
this perspective, we will see that a precise definition of causality can be couched in the
standard probabilistic language of measure theory. Rather than defining causality in terms
of “direct manipulations” of X , we will define X as causal for Y if the potential outcomes
YX=x are unequal on subsets of nonzero measure. We emphasize throughout this work that
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causal models are probabilistic models with structured constraints between observed and
unobserved (i.e., potential outcome) random variables.
We should be clear that we do not claim to unify probability theory with causality. The
notion ceteris paribus from Definition 1 was formalized in probabilistic language as early as
1944 by Haavelmo [11, 2]. Today, probability is the common language of all modern causal
inference frameworks. Within the Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAG) framework, causal rela-
tionships are discovered by searching for sets random variables satisfying certain conditional
independence relationships [12, 13, 14]. Within the potential outcomes framework of causal-
ity [8, 9, 10], the primary goal is to estimate causal effects, defined in terms of expectations
of partially observable random variables (e.g., the ACE). In each framework, causal relation-
ships map onto probabilistic relationships, which are in turn diagnosed by statistical tests.
The contribution of the present work is not to unify causality with probability, but rather
to explicate fundamental concepts of modern causal inference in the language of measure
theory.
Clarifying the interface between causality and measure theory is useful for several rea-
sons. First, measure theory provides a simplifying perspective for understanding the basic
framework of causality. Classical probability theory, we will find, is completely sufficient to
describe causal models. Second, the measure theoretic perspective is an insightful one. For
instance, we find that consideration of the underlying probability spaces provides insight into
experimental procedures (such as randomization) and non-experimental procedures (such as
matching). Additionally, a simple method of visualizing causal models on probability spaces,
which we employ throughout this work, enables one to generate and reason about a rich set
of instructive examples. Third, by making explicit the relationship between causality and
measure theory, we hope to initiate interest in applying the tools from measure theory to
further develop causal inference.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide a brief
overview of the measure theoretic framework of probability theory. We also introduce ex-
amples, notation, and a method for visualizing causal models that will frequently be used
in later sections. In Section 3 we closely examine the simplest causal system: two binary
random variables. Here we review the potential outcomes framework within the language of
probability spaces, emphasizing that potential outcomes are simply random variables in the
familiar sense of classical probability theory. We also introduce a formal definition of causal-
ity and a formal model for experimental randomization in this simple system. In Section
4, we consider a system of three binary random variables, an incrementally more complex
system that introduces several new conceptual challenges. First, we see how two random
variables may be jointly causal for a third random variable, despite neither being individually
causal. We also re-examine the concept of matching–a popular method of causal inference
in the observational setting–from the measure theoretic perspective. Finally, in Section 5 we
expand the ideas developed in Sections 3 and 4 to more general causal models.
3
2 Background and notation: probability spaces and vi-
sual representation
In the present section, we provide a brief review of the measure theoretic framework of clas-
sical probability theory, both to establish notation and to introduce a method for visualizing
probabilistic systems that we will use throughout this work. For a more detailed review of
classical probability theory, please refer to Appendix A
The central construct within the measure theoretic framework of probability theory is
the probability space. Denoted by the triple (Ω,F , P ), the probability space consists of
a sample space (Ω), a σ-algebra (F), and a probability measure (P ). A random
variable X is an F -measurable function, mapping elements ω ∈ Ω (called random out-
comes) to R. Somewhat counter-intuitively, random variables are deterministic functions
of ω. Perfect knowledge of ω implies perfect knowledge of a random variable; uncertainty
in ω results in uncertainty in a random variable. A random variable X and a probability
measure P together define the probability law PX , which maps elements B of the Borel
σ-algebra B to R as follows:
PX(B) ≡ P (X
−1(B))
The goal of classical statistical inference is to understand the probability law PX from ob-
served realizations of the random variable X(ω).
Throughout this work, we will find it convenient to visually represent random variables
on a simple probability space probability space, which we call the square space. The square
space is defined by the triple (Ω,F , P ) = ([0, 1]2,B2, µ2), where the sample space [0, 1]
2 is
the unit square in R2, B2 is the Borel σ-algebra on [0, 1]
2, and µ2 is the two-dimensional
Lebesgue measure (equivalent to the common notion of “area”). We will find the square
space particularly useful because it is both amenable to visualization and flexible enough
to accommodate many probabilistic systems. In Figure 1, we represent a binary random
variable X on the square space. In this, and in all following examples, shaded regions of the
sample space correspond to the pre-image of 1 for the corresponding binary random variable.
Therefore, all points in the upper half of Ω map to 1 and all points in the lower half of Ω
map to 0. Since the underlying probability measure is the Lebesgue measure, the probability
law for X is that of a fair coin: PX(0) = PX(1) =
1
2
.
Multiple random variables can be defined on a single probability space with multivariate
probability laws defined in the natural way. If X and Y are two random variables defined
on (Ω,F , P ), then the multivariate random variable (X, Y ) is defined as the following map
between Ω and R2:
(X, Y )(ω) = (X(ω), Y (ω)) ∈ R2
The joint probability law PX,Y is defined as a map between B2, the Borel σ-algebra on R
2,
and R:
PX,Y (B2) = P ((X, Y )
−1(B2))
If for any Borel rectangle BX × BY ∈ B2, we have the relationship
PX,Y (BX × BY ) = PX(BX)PY (BY )
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Ω0 1
F0 = X
−1(0)
F1 = X
−1(1)
X(ω)X(ω)
Figure 1: A binary random variable X on the square sample. Shaded regions denote the
pre-image of 1. Black points correspond to individual elements of the sample space.
Ω
x
y R
2
0 1
0
1
(X, Y )(ω)
Figure 2: A system of two binary random variables X and Y defined on the square space.
The pre-image of 1 for the random variable X is the upper half of Ω. The pre-image of 1 for
the random variable Y is the upper right triangle.
then X and Y are called independent . Otherwise, X and Y are dependent .
In Figure 2, we represent two binary random variables X and Y simultaneously on the
square space. X is defined as in Figure 1, while Y maps ω from the upper right triangle to
1. The region where both X and Y map ω to 1 is shaded darker; in this region, (X, Y )(ω) =
(1, 1). In this example, X and Y are dependent. This can be seen qualitatively from Figure
2 by noting that the distribution of Y differs on the subsets X−1(1) and X−1(0).
Two probability spaces (Ω1,F1, P1) and (Ω2,F2, P2) can be used to construct a third
probability space, called the product space:
(Ω,F , P ) = (Ω1 × Ω2,F1 × F2, P1 × P2)
A feature of the product space construction, which we will make use of in our discussion
of experimental randomization, is that it induces independence between random variables.
In particular, when X is defined on (Ω1,F1, P1) and Y is defined on (Ω2,F2, P2), X and Y
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(X, Y )(ω)
Figure 3: The probability space (Ω,F , P ) is formed by the product of spaces the spaces
(Ω1,F1, P1) and (Ω2,F2, P2). The two binary random variables X and Y defined separately
on the original probability spaces are independent on the product space.
are independent random variables when defined jointly on the product space (Ω1×Ω2,F1×
F2, P1 × P2). Figure 3 displays a product space construction. In this example,
(Ω1,F1, P1) = (Ω2,F2, P2) = ([0, 1],B1, µ1)
where B1 is the Borel σ-algebra on [0, 1] and µ1 is the one-dimensional Lebesgue measure. The
product space is therefore the square space, ([0, 1]2,B2, µ2), and X and Y are independent
random variables by construction.
Before discussing causal models in the following sections, it is important to note that
measure theoretic framework of probability just discussed initially seems at odds with causal
intuitions. In particular, the causal notion of random variables affecting one another is
unnatural under the measure theoretic model in which all random variables are functions
of a single random outcome selected from the sample space. Later we will see that this
contradiction is superficial. Causal models are a special class of probabilistic models, with
structured relationships between observed and unobserved (i.e., potential outcome) random
variables.
3 Causal inference on two variables
The minimal causal model, and by far the most studied, is that of a binary treatment and a
binary response. For the sake of simplicity, this is where we begin. We frame our discussion
around the quintessential causal inference question: Does smoking cause lung cancer?
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3.1 Smoking and lung cancer
We model both smoking (X) and lung cancer (Y ) as binary random variables on the square
space as in Figure 2. In this example, the marginal probability of both smoking and lung
cancer is 1/2. A natural (but incorrect) approach one may take to quantify the effect of
smoking on lung cancer is to estimate the Average Observed Effect :
AOE ≡ E[Y |X = 1]− E[Y |X = 0] (1)
For this particular example, AOE = 3/4− 1/4 = 1/2.
As a population quantity, the AOE must be estimated. Given a dataset of n i.i.d.
realizations of the bivariate random variable (X, Y ), one can compute the quantity:
ÂOE =
1
n1
∑
i:X(i)=1
Y (i) −
1
n0
∑
i:X(i)=0
Y (i)
where n1 =
∑
iXi, n0 = n−n1, and (X
(i), Y (i)) denotes the ith sample (superscripts are used
rather than subscripts to avoid confusion with notation introduced later). The law of large
numbers ensures that ÂOE converges to the true AOE as n → ∞. Given enough samples,
therefore, the AOE is estimable from the observed data.
While the AOE is estimable from observable data, it does not generally correspond to any
causal quantity. In particular, AOE = 1/2 implies nothing about how the incidence of lung
cancer would change under an intervention in which cigarettes are eliminated from society
altogether. Importantly, the difference in the conditional means of Y could be completely
or partially explained by a third confounding variable Z.
3.2 Potential outcome random variables
The potential outcomes of the Neyman-Rubin model (NRM) [8, 15] provide a language for
causality distinct from statistical relationships between observed random variables. Following
convention, we notate potential outcomes with subscripts and describe them intuitively as
follows:
Yx = “Y if X had been x”
If Y1 = 0, then lung cancer would not be observed (Y = 0) in this particular individual if
he had smoked, irrespective of whether or not he actually did smoke (X = 1). Potential
outcomes are often described in the language of of “alternate universes.” If X = 1, then Y1 is
observed as Y . On the other hand, Y0 is observed in the alternate universe which is identical
to our universe in all respects except for the fact that X = 0.
Though useful for intuition, this description of potential outcomes in terms of counterfac-
tual realities is not stated in terms of probability spaces. In the present work, we emphasize
that potential outcomes are familiar objects: random variables mapping ω ∈ Ω to R defined
on the same probability space as the random variables X and Y . Potential outcomes are
defined here according to a relationship with observable random variables. In the current
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Y˜ −10 (1)
Y˜ −11 (1)
Y¯ −10 (1)
Y¯ −11 (1)
Yˇ −10 (1)
Yˇ −11 (1)
(a)
(b) (c) (d)
Ω
Ω
Ω
Ω
Ω
Ω
Ω
Figure 4: (a) The system of random variables X and Y from Figure 2. (b)-(d) Alternative
sets of potential outcomes (Y0, Y1) consistent with the observed random variables X and Y .
example, the potential outcomes Yx are related to the observable random variable Y by the
following equation:
Y (ω) = I0(ω)Y0(ω) + I1(ω)Y1(ω) (2)
where Ix is the indicator random variable for the event X = x. This relationship, further
generalized in Section 4 and 5 by the contraction operation, defines the essential structure
of a causal model.
One important feature of Equation 2 is that Y0 and Y1 are never simultaneously observed
for a single ω; Y1(ω) is observed only when X(ω) = 1 while Y0(ω) is observed only when
X(ω) = 0. This observation is typically referred to as the fundamental problem of
causal inference. As a consequence of the fundamental problem of causal inference, there
are generally many distinct sets of potential outcomes consistent with the observed random
variables. For example the three distinct sets of potential outcomes (Y˜0, Y˜1), (Y¯0, Y¯1), and
(Yˇ0, Yˇ1) from Figure 4 are all consistent with the observable random variables in Figure 2.
This is achieved since Y˜0 = Y¯0 = Yˇ0 on the pre-image X
−1(0), while Y˜1 = Y¯1 = Yˇ1 on
the pre-image X−1(1). However, on X−1(0), the potential outcomes Y˜1, Y¯1, and Yˇ1 may
differ without altering the observed random variable Y . Likewise on X−1(1), the potential
outcomes Y˜0, Y¯0, and Yˇ0 may differ without altering the observed random variable Y .
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3.3 Causal effects
With potential outcomes, we can now define precise notions of causal effects by comparing
the random variables Y0 and Y1. The definition below improves on the informal Definition 1
by providing an unambiguous way to assess whether a binary random variable X is causal
for another random variable Y .
Definition 2 (Formal definition of causality). A binary random variable X is causal for
another random variable Y (denoted X → Y ) if Y0(ω) 6= Y1(ω) on a subset F ∈ F of
nonzero measure.
Referring to Figure 4, we see that if the set of potential outcomes are either (Y¯0, Y¯1) or
(Yˇ0, Yˇ1), then we would conclude that X is causal for Y . However, if the true set of potential
outcomes is (Y˜0, Y˜1), then we would conclude that X is not causal for Y . Importantly,
each set of potential outcomes is consistent with the observable random variables X and
Y . Irrespective of how large our sample is, we cannot conclude whether X is causal for
Y from the observed data alone. Definition 2 makes clear that the fundamental problem
of causal inference is in direct conflict with any attempt to determine causal relationships
from observed data. We develop this relationship further in Section 5, where we generalize
Definition 2 and the fundamental problem of causal inference beyond the simple treatment
and response paradigm discussed in the present section.
As was noted previously, it is typically not the case that we have complete knowledge of
the probability space. Rather, we observe realizations of random variables. Through these
observations we then try to infer their probability laws. Thus, it is important to have a
definition of causality that depends only on distributional information. Perhaps the most
important such metric is the average causal effect (ACE):
ACE ≡ E[Y1]− E[Y0] (3)
Referring again to Figure 4, we can compute the following:
E[Y˜1]− E[Y˜0] = 1/2− 1/2 = 0
E[Y¯1]− E[Y¯0] = 3/8− 5/8 = −1/4
E[Yˇ1]− E[Yˇ0] = 5/8− 5/8 = 0
If the underlying potential outcomes are (Y˜0, Y˜1), then the ACE is zero, consistent with
the observation that X is not causal for Y . However, assuming the potential outcomes are
(Yˇ0, Yˇ1) yields an ACE which is also zero, despite the fact that X is casual for Y . Finally, if
the potential outcomes are (Y¯0, Y¯1), then the ACE is −1/4. This is opposite in sign to the
observable AOE which we found in Section 3.1 to be 1/2.
This example suggests that a nonzero ACE implies that X is causal for Y (although the
inverse implication does not hold). For example, E[Y¯1] − E[Y¯0] 6= 0 and X is causal for Y
under the set of potential outcomes (Y¯1, Y¯0) in Figure 4. Corollary 1 below confirms this
relationship for the case of binary X and Y .
Corollary 1 ((ACE 6= 0) =⇒ (X → Y )). For binary X and Y , if ACE 6= 0 then X is
causal for Y
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Proof. We first note that
(ACE 6= 0) =⇒ (E[Y1] 6= E[Y0]) =⇒ (P (Y
−1
1 (1)) 6= P (Y
−1
0 (1)))
since Y is assumed to be binary. Decomposing P (Y −11 (1) and P (Y
−1
0 (1)),
P (Y −11 (1)) = P (Y
−1
1 (1) ∩ Y
−1
0 (1)) + P (Y
−1
1 (1) \ Y
−1
0 (1))
P (Y −10 (1)) = P (Y
−1
1 (1) ∩ Y
−1
0 (1)) + P (Y
−1
0 (1) \ Y
−1
1 (1))
we notice
P (Y −11 (1) \ Y
−1
0 (1)) 6= P (Y
−1
0 (1) \ Y
−1
1 (1))
Therefore at least one of the events Y −11 (1) \ Y
−1
0 (1) or Y
−1
0 (1) \ Y
−1
1 (1) must have nonzero
measure. Therefore, by Definition 2, X → Y .
As a brief side note, it is at least conceptually clear how one could generalize Definition
2 to handle non-binary X . In particular, if X(Ω) ⊆ R denotes the image of X , then X is
causal for Y if the set of potential outcomes {Yx}x∈X(Ω) differ on a set F ∈ F of nonzero
measure. However, when X(Ω) contains infinitely many elements, it may be the case that
the potential outcomes {Yx}x∈X(Ω) differ on a subset of F ∈ F of nonzero measure, however
this occurs for a subset G ∈ X(Ω) of zero measure. For instance, suppose X(Ω) = [0, 1] and
all of the potential outcomes {Yx}x∈[0,1] are identical except for the potential outcome Y1,
which differs from all other potential outcomes on all of Ω. For simplicity, we avoid such
subtleties, considering exclusively finite discrete random variables in the present work, where
the generalization of Definition 2 is obvious.
3.4 Randomization
We saw in the previous section a set of observable random variables (X, Y ) consistent with
many sets of potential outcome random variables (Y0, Y1) each implying different causal
relationships. We also saw that determining whetherX is causal for Y according to Definition
2 is generally impossible since Y0 and Y1 are never simultaneously observable for any single
ω ∈ Ω. Similarly, computing the ACE is generally impossible since it requires evaluating
expectations of random variables (Y0, Y1), which we only observe on incomplete and disjoint
subsets of the sample space Ω.
However, when X is independent of the potential outcomes (Y0, Y1) (which we will denote
as X ⊥ (Y0, Y1) ) estimation of the average causal effect is possible. When this is the case,
the following simple argument shows that AOE = ACE:
AOE = E[Y |X = 1]− E[Y |X = 0]
= E[I0Y0 + I1Y1|X = 1]− E[I0Y0 + I1Y1|X = 0]
= E[Y1|X = 1]− E[Y0|X = 0]
= E[Y1]− E[Y0]
= ACE
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The second line follows from the first line by applying Equation 2, which defines our causal
model. The fourth line follows from the third line by our assumption that X is independent
of the potential outcome random variables.
In a properly randomized experiment, it is often assumed that X ⊥ (Y0, Y1). In the
present section, we describe a measure theoretic model of the process of randomization,
which takes advantage of the product measure construction described in Section A.4.
Definition 3 (Experimental randomization of X). Suppose X and Y are defined on a proba-
bility space (Ω,F , P ). An experimental randomization of X produces a new probability
space (Ω˜, F˜ , P˜ ) and new random variables X˜ and Y˜ defined as follows:
(Ω˜, F˜ , P˜ ) ≡ (Ω× ΩR,F ×FR, P × PR) (4)
Y˜ (ω˜) ≡ I˜0(ωR)Y0(ω) + I˜1(ωR)Y1(ω) (5)
X˜(ω˜) ≡ XR(ωR) (6)
where XR is defined arbitrarily a new probability space (ΩR,FR, PR) such that PXR(x) ∈ (0, 1)
for all x.
In an experimental randomization of X , the scientist replaces the “naturally occurring”
X with an “artificially generated” XR, derived from an external source of randomization.
An ideal (although unethical) randomized experiment to determine whether smoking causes
lung cancer would allow the scientist to force individuals to smoke or not to smoke based on
the outcome of a coin toss. Under experimental randomization, the choice to smoke is tied
to an external source of randomness, and hence occurs altogether on a separate probability
space (ΩR,FR, PR). The definition of Y˜ ensures that Y˜ responds to the randomized version
(XR) in the same way that it responded to the nonrandomized version (X). Defining the new
observable random variables X˜ and Y˜ on the product space ensures that X is independent
of the potential outcome random variables (Y0, Y1) as desired.
As an example, suppose we experimentally randomize X in the example from Figure
2, where the underlying potential outcomes (Y0, Y1) are as in Figure 4(b). Suppose XR
is defined on the probability space (ΩR,FR, PR) = ([0, 1],B1, µ1), where X
−1
R (0) = [0, 1/2]
and X−1R (1) = (1/2, 0]. Then PXR(1) = PXR(0) = 1/2 as in the toss of an unbiased coin.
Then the random variables X˜ and Y˜ live on the space (Ω˜, F˜ , P˜ ) = ([0, 1]3,B3, µ3), where B3
represents the Borel σ-algebra on [0, 1]3 and µ3 represents the three dimensional Lebesgue
measure (equivalent to the common notion of volume).
Figure 5 visualizes the randomization system (X˜, Y˜ ). We can compute the AOE on the
randomized system as follows:
AOE = E[Y˜ |X˜ = 1]− E[Y˜ |X˜ = 0]
= 1/2− 1/2
= 0
= ACE
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as expected. It may be instructive to verify that AOE = ACE upon experimental randomiza-
tion of X for the three other sets of consistent potential outcomes in Figure 4, but geometric
intuition should make it clear that this will always work. For the region X˜−1(0), we observe
Y0 = Y˜ over the entire cross section Ω, so E[Y˜ |X = 0] = E[Y0]. The same reasoning makes
it clear that E[Y˜ |X = 1] = E[Y1]. These two observations imply AOE = ACE when X is
experimentally randomized.
Theorem 1 describes an even more important consequence of experimental randomization.
If X is experimentally randomized, the probability law of potential outcomes can be deduced
from observed conditional probability laws.
Theorem 1. Under experimental randomization of X,
PYx = PY˜ |X˜=x
Proof. The proof follows from simply writing out the conditional probability explicitly:
PY˜ |X˜=x(y) ≡
P˜ ({Y˜ = y} ∩ {X˜ = x})
P˜ (X˜ = x)
=
P˜
({
{Y −10 (y)×X
−1
R (0)} ∪ {Y
−1
1 (y)×X
−1
R (1)}
}
∩ {Ω×X−1R (x)}
)
P˜ ({Ω×X−1R (x))}
=
P˜ ({Y −1x (y)×X
−1
R (x))})
P˜ ({Ω×X−1R (x))}
=
P (Y −1x (y))PR(X
−1
R (x))
P (Ω)PR(X
−1
R (x))
= P (Y −1x (y))
= PYx(y)
The discussion of the present section makes clear why randomization is such a powerful
technique. In a properly randomized system, true causal quantities such as the ACE can
computed from observed data. However, it is important to recognize the shortcomings of
experimental randomization. First, experimental randomization is still inadequate for the
purposes of uncovering causality in situations like Figure 4d; although X is causal for Y
according to Definition 2, the probability laws PY0 and PY1 are identical. Second, the condi-
tions of Definition 3 are very strict. Beyond just ensuring that X ⊥ (Y0, Y1), experimental
randomization requires that XR can behave as a substitute for X in Equation 2. For in-
stance, if being involved in a randomized trial induces behavior that has some effect on lung
cancer (i.e., cognizance of enrollment in a lung cancer trial may cause participants to pursue
a healthier lifestyle), we cannot expect the causal effects computed from the randomized
trial to reflect the causal effect of smoking “in the wild.”
12
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ΩRΩ
Ω˜ = Ω× ΩR Ω× 0 Ω× 1
Figure 5: Experimental randomization of X induces a product space structure.
4 Causal inference on three variables
Several new concepts in causality arise in systems of three observable variables. As such,
in this section we study the simplest three-variable system: three binary random variables.
We add to our running example of smoking (X) and lung cancer (Y ) a third binary random
variable Z representing exercise habits. Z = 0 indicates a low level of exercise while Z = 1
indicates a high level of exercise. One could imagine exercise habits influencing both lung
cancer outcomes and smoking choices.
4.1 A comment on notation
In previous sections we only needed a single subscript to specify potential outcomes. For
instance, Y1 implicitly referred to the potential outcome “Y had X been 1.” The potential
outcome Y0 from previous sections will now be denoted YX=0 in order to distinguish it from
the potential outcome YZ=0. Further, the potential outcome “Y had X been 0 and Z been
1” will be denoted Y(X,Z)=(0,1).
4.2 Contraction
Equation 2 specifies the relationship between potential outcome random variables (YX=0, YX=1)
and observable random variables X and Y . In the case of three random variables, we might
naturally generalize Equation 2 as follows
Y (ω) =
∑
x
∑
z
I(X,Z)=(x,z)(ω)Y(X,Z)=(x,z)(ω)
Since Equation 2 must still hold, we have the following equality:
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∑
x
IX=x(ω)YX=x(ω) =
∑
x
∑
z
I(X,Z)=(x,z)(ω)Y(X,Z)=(x,z)(ω) (7)
Together with the observation that I(X,Z)=(x,z)(ω) = IX=x(ω)IZ=z(ω), Equation 7 implies the
following relationship between the double-subscripted potential outcomes Y(X,Z)=(x,z) and the
single-subscripted potential outcomes YX=x:
YX=x(ω) =
∑
z
IZ=z(ω)Y(X,Z)=(x,z)(ω)
Similar reasoning suggests the following relationship for the potential outcomes YZ=z:
YZ=z(ω) =
∑
x
IX=x(ω)Y(X,Z)=(x,z)(ω)
In this manner, any single-subscripted potential outcome may be derived from double-
subscripted potential outcomes and observable random variables: by summing over the sub-
script to be removed and multiplying by the corresponding indicator random variables. We
will refer to this operation as contraction, due to its similarity to tensorial contraction. For
instance, the set of potential outcomes {YX=x} are obtained from the potential outcomes
{Y(X,Z)=(x,z)} by “contraction over z.” The observable random variable Y can be obtained
by “contracting {Y(X,Z)=(x,z)} over x and z” or equivalently “contracting {Yx} over x.” Thus,
the simple relationship in Equation 2 represents a contraction. We will formalize and gener-
alize the notion of contraction in Section 5.
4.3 Joint causality
In a system of three binary observable random variables (X, Y, Z), Definition 2 is still appli-
cable to pairs of variables. For instance, X is causal for Y if the potential outcomes {YX=x},
obtained by contracting {Y(X,Z)=(x,z)} over z, are different on a subset of the sample space of
nonzero measure. Similarly, one can assess if Z is causal for Y by examining the potential
outcomes obtained by contracting over x.
However, it is also possible for X and Z to affect Y in a way not fully explained by their
individual effects on Y . Figure 6 displays a particularly pronounced example. Here, neither
X nor Z is causal for Y alone according to Definition 2. This is because YX=0 = YX=1 and
YZ=0 = YZ=1 for all ω ∈ Ω. In fact, all single-subscripted potential outcomes {YX=x} and
{YZ=z} equal to zero on all of Ω. For example:
YX=0(ω) = IZ=0(ω)Y(X,Z)=(0,0)(ω) + IZ=1(ω)Y(X,Z)=(0,1)(ω)
= 0
for all ω ∈ Ω. This is because YX=0 = Y(X,Z)=(0,0) on Z
−1(0), where Y(X,Z)=(0,0) = 0. Likewise
YX=0 = Y(X,Z)=(0,1) on Z
−1(1), where Y(X,Z)=(0,1) = 0. Similar calculations can be done for
each of the other three single-indexed potential outcomes YX=1, YZ=0, and YZ=1, and one
can confirm that each of these potential outcomes is identically zero on all of Ω.
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X−1(1) Z−1(1) Y −1(0)
Y −1X=0(0) Y
−1
X=1(0)
Y −1Z=0(0) Y
−1
Z=1(0)
Y
−
1(X
,Z
)=
(0
,0) (1)
Y
−
1(X
,Z
)=
(0
,1) (1)
Y
−
1(X
,Z
)=
(1
,0) (1)
Y
−
1(X
,Z
)=
(1
,1) (1)
Ω Ω Ω
Ω Ω
Ω Ω
Ω Ω
Ω
Figure 6: A system of three random variables X , Y , and Z for which X and Z are jointly
causal for Y , but neither is individually causal for Y .
However, the double-subscripted potential outcomes {Y(X,Z)=(x,z)} differ from each other
on a subset of Ω of measure one. This is because for all ω ∈ Ω (excluding the measure
zero subset along the vertical and horizontal mid-line of Ω), exactly one double-subscripted
potential outcome Y(X,Z)=(x,z) is equal to one, with each of the other three equal to zero. In
this example, we will say that X and Z are jointly causal for Y .
Before precisely defining joint causality, we first recognize that Definition 2 can also
apply to causal relationships between observable and potential outcome random variables.
Noting that YX=x is itself a random variable, we can conclude that Z is causal for YX=x if
Y(X,Z)=(x,0) 6= Y(X,Z)=(x,1) on a subset F ∈ F of nonzero measure. Intuitively, if z is causal
for YX=x, the effect X has on Y is modified by the value Z.
However, Z being causal for YX=x alone does not capture the notion of joint causality.
For example, consider the set of potential outcomes {Y(X,Z)=(x,z)} displayed in Figure 7. In
this case, Z is causal for YX=0 since Y(X,Z)=(0,0) and Y(X,Z)=(0,1) differ on all of Ω. Similarly,
Z is also causal for YX=1. However, the potential outcomes do not depend on the x subscript
at all: the value of Y can be determined by ω and the z subscript alone.
To ensure that we exclude scenarios like that in Figure 7, we define joint causality as
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Y −1(X,Z)=(0,0)(1)
Y −1(X,Z)=(0,1)(1)
Y −1(X,Z)=(1,0)(1)
Y −1(X,Z)=(1,1)(1)
Ω Ω Ω Ω
Figure 7: A set of potential outcomes {Y(X,Z)=(x,z)}(x,z) for which Z is causal for YX=0 and
YX=1, however X and Z are not jointly causal for Y .
follows:
Definition 4 (Joint causality). Two binary random variables X and Z are said to be jointly
causal for a third random variable Y if both of the following hold:
(i) Z is causal for YX=x for some x.
(ii) X is causal for YZ=z for some z.
According to Definition 4, X and Z are jointly causal for Y in Figure 6, but not jointly
causal in Figure 7.
As with Definition 2, some generalizations of Definition 4 obvious while others are not.
For one, Definition 4 does not at all depend on X and Z being binary; the definition is
equally applicable to any finite discrete X and Z. When either X or Z are continuous, we
encounter the same subtleties as in Definition 2. We can also imagine the definition of joint
causality applying to sets of more than two random variables. For three random variables
A, B and C to be jointly causal for a fourth random variable Y , we require i) A to be causal
for Y(B,C)=(b,c) for some (b, c) ii) B to be causal for Y(A,C)=(a,c) for some (a, c) and iii) C to
be causal for Y(A,B)=(a,b) for some (a, b). The generalization to four or more finite discrete
random variables is now straightforward.
4.4 Joint randomization
In Theorem 1, we saw that experimental randomization of X allowed us to infer the dis-
tribution of the potential outcome YX=x from the distribution of the observable random
variable Y˜ |X˜ = x. In the present section, we show how one can simultaneously randomize
X and Z to infer the distribution of the potential outcomes Y(X,Z)=(x,z). This procedure of
simultaneous randomization, detailed in Definition 5, is a natural extension of the procedure
detailed in Definition 3.
Definition 5 (Joint experimental randomization of X and Z). Suppose X, Y , and Z are
defined on a probability space (Ω,F , P ). A joint experimental randomization of X
and Z produces a new probability space (Ω˜, F˜ , P˜ ) and new random variables X˜, Y˜ , and Z˜
defined as follows:
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(Ω˜, F˜ , P˜ ) ≡ (Ω× ΩR,F × FR, P × PR) (8)
Y˜ (ω˜) ≡
∑
x
∑
z
I˜(X˜,Z˜)=(x,z)(ωR)Y(X,Z)=(x,z)(ω) (9)
X˜(ω˜) ≡ XR(ωR) (10)
Z˜(ω˜) ≡ ZR(ωR) (11)
where XR and ZR are defined arbitrarily on a probability spaces (ΩR,FR, PR) such that
P(XR,ZR)(x, z) ∈ (0, 1) for all (x, y).
In the definition of joint experimental randomization, we do not require X and Z to be
randomized on separate probability spaces. In other words, joint experimental randomization
of X and Z does not necessarily require X˜ and Z˜ to be independent of each other. Of course,
randomizing X and Z on separate probability spaces (ΩXR ,F
X
R , P
X
R ) and (Ω
Z
R,F
Z
R , P
Z
R ) such
that the randomized probability space is
(Ω˜, F˜ , P˜ ) = (Ω× ΩXR × Ω
Z
R,F ×F
X
R × F
Z
R , P × P
X
R × P
Z
R )
also satisfies Definition 5.
Lastly we prove that joint experimental randomization allows us to observe the distribu-
tion double-subscripted potential outcomes. This result extends Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. Under joint experimental randomization of X and Z,
PY(X,Z)=(x,z) = PY˜ |(X˜=x,Z˜=z)
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of the proof of Theorem 1. We simply write out the
conditional probability explicitly:
PY˜ |(X˜=x,Z˜=z)(y) ≡
P˜ ({Y˜ = y} ∩ {X˜ = x} ∩ {Z˜ = z})
P˜ ({X˜ = x} ∩ {Z˜ = z})
=
P˜
(
∪(x′,z′)
{
Y −1(X,Z)=(x′,z′)(y)× (X
−1
R (x
′) ∩ Z−1R (z
′))
}
∩ {Ω×X−1R (x)} ∩ {Ω× Z
−1
R (z)}
)
P˜ ({Ω×X−1R (x)} ∩ {Ω× Z
−1
R (z)}
=
P˜
(
∪(x′,z′)
{
Y −1(X,Z)=(x′,z′)(y)× (X
−1
R (x
′) ∩ Z−1R (z
′))
}
∩ {Ω× (X−1R (x) ∩ Z
−1
R (z))}
)
P˜ ({Ω× (X−1R (x) ∩ Z
−1
R (z))}
=
P˜
(
Y −1(X,Z)=(x,z)(y)× (X
−1
R (x
′) ∩ Z−1R (z
′))
)
P˜ ({Ω× (X−1R (x) ∩ Z
−1
R (z))}
=
P (Y −1(X,Z)=(x,z)(y))PR(X
−1
R (x) ∩ Z
−1
R (z))
P (Ω)PR(X
−1
R (x) ∩ Z
−1
R (z))
= P (Y −1(X,Z)=(x,z)(y))
= PY(X,Z)=(x,z)(y)
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4.5 Matching from the perspective of probability spaces
Sections 3.4 and 4.4 describe how experimental randomization can be used to uncover causal
relationships. In many applications, however, experimental randomization is not possible due
to practical limitations or ethical concerns. As such, much causal inference literature focuses
on methods that do not require experimental randomization. While these methods can be
applied to data collected in observational settings, they often require strong assumptions. In
the present section, we study one particular method for observational causal inference: an
elementary matching method called exact paired matching. While the shortcomings of
exact paired matching have been previously recognized [16, 17], the purpose of our discussion
is to show how a measure theoretic perspective can provide additional clarity. We discuss
matching in this section because it necessitates a minimum of three variables: a treatment
(X), a response (Y ), and a matching variable (Z).
The strategy of exact paired matching is to subsample the original dataset, retaining
only pairs of individuals that i) are identical on covariates Z and ii) differ in their receipt of
treatment X . The matched dataset then consist of nM triples of the form
(Y (i,0), Y (i,1),Z(i))
where Y (i,0) is the value of the response for the untreated (X = 0) member of the ith
matched pair (and likewise for Y (i,1)). Both individuals take the same value Z(i) for the
matching variables. The subsampled dataset is then analyzed as if it were obtained from an
experimentally randomized experiment. For instance, the sample AOE may be reported as
an estimate of the ACE:
ÂCEM =
1
nM
∑
i
Y (i,1) −
1
nM
∑
i
Y (i,0)
This procedure is motivated by the intuition that matched pairs of individuals are similar
in all respects except treatment; it would then seem that differences in their outcomes are
more reasonably attributable to differences in their treatment. ÂCEM , which may also be
written as 1
nM
∑
i(Y
(i,1) − Y (0,i)), is then the average of these treatment-attributable differ-
ences. This argument seems more tenable the more matching variables are used: matched
pairs being increasingly comparable. However, including additional covariates in Z poses
several challenges. First, even a modest number of covariates may result an unreasonably
large set of distinct values of z. Twenty binary covariates, for instance, yields more than a
million distinct z combinations. A dataset of modest size may have very few (or potentially
zero) available triples (Y (i,0), Y (i,1), Z(i)). The measure theoretic perspective makes clear
additional challenges, as we discuss below.
Let Z ≡ (Z1, Z2, . . . , ZK) be a set of matching covariates and let Z1:k denote the subset
(Z1, Z2, . . . , Zk). (Note that the subscripts Zi in this case denote distinct matching vari-
ables, rather than potential outcomes.) Let Zj(Ω) denote the image of the covariate Zj and
Z1:k(Ω) = Z1(Ω)×Z2(Ω)×. . .×Zk(Ω). Throughout this discussion, we assume for simplicity
that each matching variable is finite discrete, so that Z1:k(Ω) is a finite set. We denote Z1:k
as the subset of Z1:k(Ω) for which both treatment (X = 1) and non-treatment (X = 0)
occur with positive probability:
Z1:k ≡ {z1:k ∈ Z1:k(Ω) : 0 < P (X
−1(1) ∩Z−11:k(z1:k)) < 1}
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We denote ΩM1:k the subset of Ω on which matched pairs are found with positive probability
when Z1:k are used as matching variables. Ω
M
1:k can be expressed as follows:
ΩM1:k ≡
⋃
z1:k∈Z1:k
Z
−1
1:k(z1:k) (12)
The following result shows that as k increases, ΩM1:k form nested subsets.
Theorem 3 (ΩM1:k form nested subsets). Under exact paired matching,
ΩM1:k ⊇ Ω
M
1:(k+1)
Proof. If z∗1:k ∈ Z¯1:k (the complement of Z1:k), then (z
∗
1:k, zk+1) ∈ Z¯1:(k+1) for all zk+1 ∈
Zk+1(Ω). This is because if z
∗
1:k ∈ Z¯1:k, then P (X
−1(1) ∩ Z−11:k(z
∗
1:k)) = 0 or P (X
−1(0) ∩
Z−11:k(z
∗
1:k)) = 0. Suppose, without loss of generality, that P (X
−1(1) ∩ Z−11:k(z
∗
1:k)) = 0. Then:
P (X−1(1) ∩ Z−11:k(z
∗
1:k)) = P

X−1(1)⋂

 ⋃
zk+1∈Zk+1(Ω)
(Z1:k, Zk+1)
−1(z∗1:k, zk+1)




= P

 ⋃
zk+1∈Zk+1(Ω)
X−1(1)
⋂
(Z1:k, Zk+1)
−1(z∗1:k, zk+1)


=
∑
zk+1∈Zk+1(Ω)
P (X−1(1) ∩ (Z1:k, Zk+1)
−1(z∗1:k, zk+1))
= 0
Since the final sum is equal to zero, each term P (X−1(1) ∩ (Z1:k, Zk+1)
−1(z∗1:k, zk+1)) equals
zero. This implies Ω¯M1:k ⊆ Ω¯
M
1:(k+1), which in turn implies Ω
M
1:k ⊇ Ω
M
1:(k+1), as required. This
final implication is a consequence of the equivalence between a conditional and it’s corre-
sponding contrapositive.
Figure 8 provides intuition for Corollary 3 by visualizing an example of exact paired
matching on the square space. The three consecutive panels of Figure 8 display Ω, ΩM1 , and
ΩM1:2, respectively, when matching is performed on two finite discrete random variables. The
fact that Ω ⊇ ΩM1 ⊇ Ω
M
1:2 can be seen as a consequence of each additional matching variable
more finely partitioning Ω (in other words, Ω ⊂ ΣZ1 ⊂ Σ(Z1,Z2)).
Corollary 3 has two important ramifications for exact paired matching. The first con-
cerns the decreasing size of the matched sample as more matching covariates are included.
It has already been mentioned that as more matching covariates are added, the number of
distinct combinations may far exceed the size of the sample itself. Corollary 3 makes clear
that there is an additional compounding problem. As a simple consequence of Corollary 3,
P (ΩM1:k) ≥ P (Ω
M
1:(k+1)). Therefore, the space on which viable matched pairs may be found
with positive probability reduces in measure as more matching variables are added. The
second ramification, closely related to the first, involves an inherent bias. The subset of Ω
ignored entirely under exact paired matching, ΩM1:k increases in size as more matching vari-
ables are included. If YX=0 and YX=1 differ on Ω¯
M
1:k but are identical on Ω
M
1:k, any downstream
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Ω ΩM1 Ω
M
1:2
Figure 8: (left) The observable random variables X and Y as in Figure 2. (middle) The
atoms defined by the matching variable Z1, delineated by a 3× 3 grid, partition Ω. All but
ΩM1 is occluded. (right) The atoms defined by the matching variables Z1 and Z2, delineated
by a 9× 9 grid, partition Ω. All but ΩM1:2 is occluded.
analysis of causality relying the matched sample will miss this causal relationship. Even in
the infinite sample limit, this second problem persists.
Although exact paired matching seeks to emulate the behavior of experimental random-
ization by creating a dataset in which covariates are independent from treatment, a compar-
ison between Figure 5 and Figure 8 clearly illustrates how different these two procedures are.
While experimental randomization allows one to observe samples of the potential outcomes
YX=0 and YX=1 across the entire original sample space Ω, matching may exclude information
from virtually all of Ω. Experimental randomization ensures that the difference in sample
means will converge to the true ACE in the large sample limit. The quantity produced by
exact paired matching, ÂCEM , has a far more opaque interpretation. Without additional
assumptions, it need not converge to any causal quantity of interest.
5 A general framework for causal systems
In Sections 3 and 4, we carefully examined systems of two or three observable random
variables in order to build intuition and demonstrate important features of causality from
a measure theoretic perspective. In the present section, we attempt to move beyond these
simple (though instructive) systems by providing an axiomatic framework for a general model
of causality, which we term an observable causal system (OCS). An OCS builds on the simple
models discussed above in two ways. First, we will consider collections of arbitrarily many
finite discrete random variables. Second, we allow all random variables to be causal for
each other. In providing a more general model, our axiomatic framework has the additional
benefit of being amenable to a more formal description of causality. We therefore examine
some of the immediate corollaries of our set of causal axioms, and describe how the basic
structure of causality emerges as corollaries to the axioms.
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5.1 A comment on notation
In the present section, we will consider systems of n observable random variables. Since
subscripts are reserved for potential outcomes, superscripts will be used to index each of
these random variables and should not be confused with exponentiation. Thus, we will
denote a set of n random variables as {X1, X2, . . . , Xn}.
We will often need to refer to subsets of the random variables {X1, X2, . . . , Xn}. We
denote S = {s1, s2, . . . , sk} to be an arbitrary subset of the integers {1, 2, . . . , n} and S¯ to
be the complement of S (S ∪ S¯ = {1, 2, . . . , n}). We refer to the the multivariate random
variable (Xs1, Xs2, . . . , Xsk) as XS . Then, Xd
X
S=xS denotes the potential outcome
Xd(Xs1 ,Xs2 ,...,Xsk )=(xs1 ,xs2 ,...,xsk)
For compactness, sometimes we will use the shorthand Xd
xS
= Xd
X
S=xS when there is no
possibility of confusion. As an example, for n = 4, d = 3, S = {1, 2, 4}, and xS = (0, 1, 1),
Xd
xS
= Xd
X
S=xS
= X3(X1,X2,X4)=(0,1,1)
In words, this potential outcome is “X3 had X1 been 0, X2 been 1, and X4 been 1.”
5.2 Definition of an observable causal system
Let X denote the multivariate random variable (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) and X i(Ω) the image of
the random variable X i. Assuming that each X i is a discrete finite random variable, then
X(Ω) ≡ X1(Ω) × X2(Ω) × . . . × Xn(Ω) is a finite set. We do not consider the setting of
continuous random variables in this work. For each x ∈ X(Ω), we define the indicator
random variable
IX=x(ω) =
{
1 : X(ω) = x
0 : X(ω) 6= x
Definition 6 (Observable causal system). A set of random variables {X1, X2, . . .Xn} de-
fined on the probability space (Ω,F , P ) is an observable causal system if the following
properties hold:
1. Existence of potential outcomes: For all x ∈ X(Ω), there exists a random vari-
able X i
X=x for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. These random variables are called complete
potential outcomes.
2. Observational Consistency: The indicators partially determine the complete po-
tential outcomes. Specifically,
(IX=x(ω) = 1) =⇒ (XX=x(ω) = x)
We will say that a random variable is identified at ω if its value is determined by
observational consistency.
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3. Partial consistency: For a subset S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} and S¯ denoting the complement
of S, the indicators and potential outcomes may be derived according to the following
generalized contraction procedures:
I
X
S=xS (ω) ≡
∑
xS¯
IX=x(ω)
X i
X
S=xS
(ω) ≡
∑
xS¯
I
X
S¯=xS¯ (ω)X
i
X=x(ω)
If S 6= {1, 2, . . . , n}, then X i
X
S=xS
is called a partial potential outcome. We say
that the set of partial potential outcomes {X
X
S=xS} are derived from the complete
potential outcomes {XX=x} by contracting over S¯.
Definition 6 formalizes the essential features of causality discussed in Sections 3 and 4.
Axiom 1 ensures that all conceivable potential outcomes exist while Axioms 2 and 3 con-
strict how the potential outcomes are related to each other and observable random variables
through contraction. As previously mentioned, an OCS generalizes the simple causal systems
studied in Sections 3 and 4 in two ways. First, an OCS allows systems of arbitrarily many
(rather than just two or three) finite discrete (rather than just binary) random variables.
Second, an OCS allows all observable random variables to be causal for one another.
The first generalization is conceptually straightforward; largely, it is a matter of extending
notation. The second generalization is more fundamental. By allowing potentially all random
variables to be causal for each other, we need to consider several new types of potential
outcomes. In the simple system of two binary observable random variables X and Y , we
previously only considered the potential outcomes YX=x. Now we also consider the potential
outcomes XY=y. Just as X can be causal for Y if YX=0 6= YX=1 on some subset of nonzero
measure, so too can Y be causal for X if XY=0 6= XY=1 on some subset of nonzero measure.
This allows for the possibility of feedback in an OCS; something which is excluded in DAG
models.
An additional, minor subtlety introduced by Definition 6 is that of self-referential in-
dices. For example, in an observable causal system of two binary random variables X and
Y , we assume not only the existence of potential outcomes YX=0 and YX=1, but also the
complete potential outcomes Y(X,Y )=(0,0), Y(X,Y )=(0,1), Y(X,Y )=(1,0), and Y(X,Y )=(1,1). Although
self-referential indices have no intuitive interpretation, we decide to include them for the sake
of notational compactness. With self-referential indices, the complete potential outcomes for
each observable random variable, {X i
x
}, take on the same sets of indices for each i. Another
benefit is that self-referential indices simplify the statement of the observational consistency
axiom. Again for two binary random variables, observational consistency simply states that
when X = x and Y = y, the complete potential outcomes are as expected: X(X,Y )=(x,y) = x
and Y(X,Y )=(x,y) = y. In practice, we will only consider potential outcomes in which the
self-referential index has been contracted out.
5.3 Generalized definition of causality
The definition of an OCS provided above suggests the following definition of causality, which
generalizes Definition 2.
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Definition 7 (Generalized definition of causality). A set of variables XS is causal for a
random variable X i (denoted XS → X i) if X i
X
S=xS
6= X i
X
S=x˜S
for xS 6= x˜S on a subset
F ∈ F of nonzero measure.
When XS consists of a single binary random variable, Definition 7 recapitulates Definition
2. When XS consists of multiple random variables, Definition 7 describes the joint causality
scenario detailed in Section 4.3. One notable feature of Definition 7 is that it does not
preclude the possibility of feedback. For instance, X i → Xj and Xj → X i may both be
true. As we will see in Section 5.5 below, a general version of the fundamental problem of
causal inference precludes possibility of identifying causal relationships from observable data
alone.
Remark: Although Definition 7 does not specifically exclude the possibility that i ∈ S, it
is only of practical interest when i 6∈ S.
5.4 A detailed example
In this section we briefly reexamine our example of two binary random variables, introduced
in Figure 2 and discussed in Section 3, to better understand the structure of an OCS and
build intuition for some of the new concepts introduced by Definition 6. Axiom 1 requires
the existence of all of the following complete potential outcomes:
{X(X,Y )=(0,0), X(X,Y )=(0,1), X(X,Y )=(1,0), X(X,Y )=(1,1),
Y(X,Y )=(0,0), Y(X,Y )=(0,1), Y(X,Y )=(1,0), Y(X,Y )=(1,1)}
Axiom 2 ensures that the complete potential outcomes are consistent with observations. As a
consequence, the complete potential are determined in some regions of Ω and undetermined in
others. We represent the implications of Axiom 2 in Figure 9. Axiom 3 allows us to derive the
partial potential outcome through contraction. In addition to the familiar partial potential
outcomes YX=x, we can also derive the partial potential outcomes YY=y. In contracting over
an additional index, the partial potential outcomes are identified over a larger portion of Ω
than the complete potential outcomes. The implications of Axiom 3 are represented in Figure
10. As a sanity check, one should also verify that the fully contracted random variables,
obtained by contracting the partial potential outcomes in Figure 10 over the single remaining
index, recovers the original observable random variables from Figure 2. This feature of the
OCM will be proved generally in Section 5.5.
5.5 Corollaries of causal axioms
In this section, we provide some immediate corollaries of the axioms presented in Section 5.2,
thereby making modest steps towards a formal theory of observable causal models. Corol-
laries 2 and 3 describe some basic features of the structure of OCM. More specifically, the
describe how observable random variables, partial potential outcomes, and complete poten-
tial outcomes relate through the operation of contraction. Corollary 4 is a generalization of
the so-called fundamental problem of causal inference.
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X(X,Y )=(0,0)(ω) X(X,Y )=(0,1)(ω) X(X,Y )=(1,0)(ω) X(X,Y )=(1,1)(ω)
Y(X,Y )=(0,0)(ω) Y(X,Y )=(0,1)(ω) Y(X,Y )=(1,0)(ω) Y(X,Y )=(1,1)(ω)
Figure 9: Visual representation of Axioms 1 and 2. The complete potential outcomes
X(X,Y )=(x,y) and Y(X,Y )=(x,y). Within the shaded (unshaded) regions of Ω, the random vari-
able maps to 1 (0). In the regions filled by diagonal lines, the complete potential outcomes
are not determined by observational consistency (i.e., where they are not identified).
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XX=0(ω) XX=1(ω) XY=0(ω) XY=1(ω)
YX=0(ω) YX=1(ω) YY=0(ω) YY=1(ω)
Figure 10: Visual representation of Axiom 3. The partial potential outcomes XX=x, XY=y,
YX=x, and YY=y.Within the shaded (unshaded) regions of Ω, the random variable maps to 1
(0). In the regions filled by diagonal lines, the complete potential outcomes are not identified.
The operation of contraction allows us to derive partial potential outcomes {X
X
S=xS}
from the complete potential outcomes {XX=x} for any subset S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n}. This
does not exclude S = ∅, in which case we are marginalizing over the full set indices since
S¯ = {1, 2, . . . , n}. The corollary below shows that the observational consistency axiom
(Axiom 2) ensures the expected result.
Corollary 2 (Observables are fully contracted potential outcomes).
X i = X i∅
Proof. By Axiom 3, we can derive X i∅ by fully contracting the complete potential outcomes:
X i∅(ω) =
∑
x
IX=x(ω)X
i
X=x(ω)
All but one of the terms in the above summation are zero. Without loss of generality, let us
assume IX=x∗(ω) = 1 with x
∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n). Then
X i∅(ω) = Ix∗(ω)X
i
x∗(ω)
= x∗i
by Axiom 2. By the definition of the indicator random variable, X(ω) = x∗, and so X i(ω) =
x∗i , as required.
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The operation of contraction allows us to consider sub-OCMs: OCMs nested within larger
OCMs. For example, consider an OCM on three observable random variables X , Y , and
Z, which we denote OCMXY Z . Suppose that data for Z has been discarded, or was never
recorded. Any downstream analysis of data from X and Y alone concerns only the sub-OCM
on X and Y , denoted OCMXY . In OCMXY the complete potential outcomes Y(X,Y )=(x,y) and
X(X,Y )=(x,y) are defined by contracting over z in the original OCM.
Self-consistency for all such sub-OCMs requires that operation of contraction be well-
behaved in various ways. For instance, Corollary 2 shows that Y can be obtained by fully
contracting the complete potential outcomes Y(X,Y,Z)=(x,y,z) of OCMXY Z . Since OCMXY is
an OCM on X and Y , then fully contracting the complete potential outcomes Y(X,Y )=(x,y)
of OCMXY should also recover Y . This requires that first contracting over z and then
contracting over x and y is equivalent to contracting over x, y, and z simultaneously. This
and other properties of contraction are summarized in Corollary 3 below.
Corollary 3 (Composition of contractions). Let us defineMS¯ as the operation of contraction
over the set S¯. Then
MS¯1 ◦MS¯2 ◦ . . . ◦MS¯n = MS¯1∪S¯2∪...∪S¯n
Proof. In Appendix B, we show that MS¯1 ◦MS¯2 = MS¯1∪S¯2 . The full result will follow by
simply applying it to an arbitrary sequence of contractions, as follows:
MS¯1 ◦MS¯2 ◦ . . . ◦MS¯n = MS¯1 ◦MS¯2 ◦ . . . ◦MS¯n−1∪S¯n
= MS¯1 ◦MS¯2 ◦ . . . ◦MS¯n−2∪S¯n−1∪S¯n
...
= MS¯1∪S¯2∪...∪S¯n
A useful observation from Corollary 3 is that contraction is commutative and associative,
since these are properties of the union operator.
Finally, we show that a very general version of the fundamental problem of causal in-
ference, discussed in Section 3.2 emerges from our axiomatic framework. In the simplest
setting, where we are trying to understand the effect of a single binary random variable X
on another random variable Y , the fundamental problem of causal inference states that the
potential outcomes YX=0 and YX=1 are never simultaneously observable. Corollary 4 below
shows that in an OCS, no two potential outcomes (complete or partial) are simultaneously
observable.
Corollary 4 (Generalized statement of the fundamental problem of causal inference). Let
X i
xS
be defined as follows:
X i
xS
≡ {ω : X i
xS
(ω) is identified}
If xS 6= x˜S, then
X i
xS
∩ X i
x˜
S = ∅
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Proof. First we note that XxS = IxS from Lemma 3 of Appendix C. Then we use Lemma 2
from Appendix C to note that IxS ∩ Ix˜S = ∅
Analogous to our observations from Section 3.3, there is a natural conflict between the
definition of causality provided by Definition 7 and the fundamental problem of causal in-
ference stated above. In particular, Definition 7 states that XS → X i if X i
X
S=xS
6= X i
X
S=x˜S
for xS 6= x˜S on some set of positive measure. Corollary 4, however, establishes that X i
X
S=xS
and X i
X
S=x˜S
are never simultaneously identified. In the absence of randomization or addi-
tional assumptions, Corollary 4 reiterates that causal effects generally cannot be determined
from observable data.
6 Discussion
In this work, we have described the interface between causal inference and classical prob-
ability and made initial steps towards developing a mathematically axiomatized theory of
observable causal models. Our discussion has been centered around a careful examination of
simple systems, each highlighting the utility of a measure theoretic perspective on different
aspects of causal inference.
There are many important questions that we have only begun to consider, and hope that
this work will initiate deeper inquiry into the relationship between causality and probabil-
ity. In extending the mathematical development of observable causal systems, an essential
future step will be the inclusion of continuous random variables. Additionally, the causal
concepts that we have explored in this work—including causal effects, causal interactions,
randomization, and matching—are by no means exhaustive. We anticipate that a measure
theoretic description of many more causal concepts will also be useful.
Throughout this work, measure theory has provided clarity and definitions to abstract
concepts. As such, we have only needed the most elementary tools from measure theory.
We believe that measure theory can also play a more constructive role in the development
of causal inference. Measure theoretic machinery has enabled many important advances,
otherwise intractable, in the development of probability and statistics. We believe that this
will also be true in the future development of causal inference.
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A Review of classical probability theory
A.1 The probability space
Definition 8 (probability space). A probability space, denoted (Ω,F , P ), consists of three
objects:
(i) Ω: A set called the sample space.
(ii) F : A set of subsets of Ω. F must contain Ω and be closed under complementations
and countable unions (i.e., F is a σ-algebra). Elements F ∈ F are called events.
(iii) P : A real-valued function defined on events F ∈ F . P must have three properties:
a) it must be nonnegative b) P (Ω) = 1 and c) for any countable sequence of mutually
exclusive events, P (∪i=1Fi) =
∑
i P (Fi). P is called the probability measure.
In the measure theoretic framework, randomness originates from the selection of elements
ω (called random outcomes) from a set Ω (rcalled the sample space). The probability
with which different outcomes ω ∈ Ω are selected is encoded by the probability measure
P . In some simple settings, P will explicitly define the probability of each random outcome.
For example, when Ω = {ω1, ω2, . . . , ωn} is a finite set, P (ωi) defines the probability that
random outcome ωi is selected. More generally however, P is defined on subsets of Ω, the
events F ∈ F . Intuitively, the probability that the selected random outcome ω belongs to
a particular event event F ∈ F is P (F ) [18]. An event F is said to have measure P (F ).
A.2 Random variables, distributions, and expectations
Typically, the probability space (Ω,F , P ) is not directly observable. Instead, we observable
random variables. A random variable X is a F-measurable function , meaning that it
has the following properties:
X : (ω ∈ Ω)→ R
X−1 : (B ∈ B)→ (F ∈ F)
In other words, random variables map elements of ω ∈ Ω to R in such a way that the
pre-image of sets B ∈ B are events F ∈ F .
A random variable X and a probability measure P define the probability law PX of X
in the following way:
PX(B) ≡ P ◦X
−1(B)
= P ({ω : X(ω) ∈ B})
The probability law precisely characterizes our uncertainty in X . For finite discrete ran-
dom variables, to which we limit ourselves in this work, the picture is simple. Denoting
{x1, . . . , xk} as the image of a random variable X , the probability law is characterized by
the events {Fx1 = X
−1(x1), . . . , Fxk = X
−1(xk)}, which partition Ω.
29
In full generality, the notion of the expectation of a random variable is an involved topic
within the measure theoretic framework. However, for our purposes, the following simple
definition for a finite discrete random variable X is sufficient:
E[X ] ≡
k∑
i=1
xiPX(xi) =
k∑
i=1
xiP (Fxi) (13)
A.3 Multiple random variables
If Y is another random variable on the same probability space (Ω,F , P ), the multivariate
random variable (X, Y ) is constructed in the natural way:
(X, Y )(ω) = (X(ω), Y (ω)) ∈ R2
We can define the joint probability law PX,Y analogously to the univariate case:
PX,Y (B2) ≡ P ◦ (X, Y )
−1(B2)
= P ({ω : (X, Y )(ω) ∈ B2})
where the B2 (an open disc, for example) is an element of B2, the Borel σ−algebra on R
2.
This joint distribution PX,Y completely determines the marginal distributions PX and PY .
Specifically, we have:
PX(BX) ≡ PX,Y (BX × R)
PY (BY ) ≡ PX,Y (R× BY )
Where × denotes the Cartesian product. Generalizing the above concepts to any number of
random variables is straightforward.
The random variable X can provide information about the random variable Y through
the conditional distribution of Y given X . Assuming PX(x) 6= 0, and that both X and Y
are finite discrete random variables, the conditional probability law for Y given X = x is
defined as follows:
PY |X=x(y) ≡
PX,Y (x, y)
PX(x)
=
P (Fy ∩ Fx)
P (Fx)
(14)
From Equation 14, we see that the conditional probability law PY |X=x depends only on the
behavior of the random variables X and Y within the subset Fx of Ω. When the random
variable Y behaves differently on different subsets Fx of Ω, then the value of X is informative
about Y . When this is the case, the conditional probability laws PY |X=x are different for
different values of x, and the random variables X and Y are called dependent . Otherwise,
when Y behaves identically on every subset Fx of Ω, then the conditional probability laws
PY |X=x are identical for every value of x and X and Y are called independent .
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A.4 Product spaces
The previous section defines independence through conditional distributions: X and Y are
independent if the conditional probability laws PY |X=x are the same for every value of x.
The present section discusses how to construct a probability space, called the product space,
on which random variables are independent by design. This construction will be useful when
we think about randomized experiments in Section 3.4.
Suppose we have two separate probability spaces (Ω1,F1, P1) and (Ω2,F2, P2). The prod-
uct space provides a prescription for combining the two probability spaces into a single one.
The three components of this product space (Ω,F , P ) are built from the components of
the original probability spaces in the following natural way:
(i) Ω: The sample space Ω is simply the Cartesian product of the original two sample
spaces:
Ω ≡ Ω1 × Ω2 = {(ω1, ω2) : ω1 ∈ Ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω2}
(ii) F : A product event F = F1×F2 is defined as follows: F ≡ {(ω1, ω2) : ω1 ∈ F1, ω2 ∈ F2}.
The product σ-algebra F , is defined as the smallest σ-algebra containing all of the
product events F1 × F2 = {F1 × F2 : F1 ∈ F1, F2 ∈ F2}.
(iii) P : The product probability measure P is generated by the rule
P (F1 × F2) = P1(F1)P2(F2) (15)
This measure is called the product measure, and is denoted P = P1 × P2.
If a random variable X is defined on (Ω1,F1, P1) and another random variable Y is
defined on (Ω2,F2, P2), then X and Y will be independent random variables on the product
space
(Ω,F , P ) ≡ (Ω1 × Ω2,F1 × F2, P1 × P2)
The product space’s ability to induce independence between random variables will be a useful
feature in this work. In particular, when we define a randomized experiment in Section 3.4,
the “treatment” X a “outcome” Y will live on a product space.
B Proof of Corollary 3
Lemma 1 (Composition of two contractions).
MS¯1 ◦MS¯2 =MS¯1∪S¯2
Proof. We formally define MS¯ as a mapping between sets of random variables:
MS¯ : {X
i
X
S′=xS′
}
xS
′ → {X i
X
S∗=xS∗
}xS∗
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where {X i
X
S=xS
}xS denotes the set of potential outcomes X
i
X
S=xS
for all values of xS ,
S∗ = S ′ \ S¯, and
X i
X
S∗=xS∗
=
∑
xS¯∩S
′
I
X
S¯∩S′=xS¯∩S′X
i
(XS
′\S¯ ,XS
′∩S¯)=(xS
′\S¯ ,xS
′∩S¯)
In words, the operator MS¯ returns a set of potential outcomes where the common indices
S¯ ∩ S ′ are removed by the laws of contraction.
Slightly abusing notation, let we will abbreviate X i
X=x by X
i
x
. Similarly, we will also
write X i
(XSa ,XSb)=(xSa ,xSb )
by X i
xSax
Sb
, where xSa specifies the elements of x indexed by Sa
for any index set Sa (and likewise for x
Sb).
We with a subset of potential outcomes
{
X i
xA
}
xA
for any index set A ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , n}. We note that we can always have the decomposition
A = (A \ S¯2) ∪ (A ∩ S¯2)
Therefore, the set:
MS¯2
({
X i
xA
}
xA
)
will have elements
X i
xS
∗ =
∑
xS¯2∩A
I
xS¯2∩A
X i
xA\S¯2xS¯2∩A
Now applying MS¯1 to the set
{
X i
xA\S¯2
}
xA\S¯2
, we have each element
X i
xS
∗∗ =
∑
xS¯1∩(A\S¯2)
I
xS¯1∩(A\S¯2)
X i
xS
∗
=
∑
xS¯1∩(A\S¯2)
I
xS¯1∩(A\S¯2)
∑
xS¯2∩A
I
xS¯2∩A
X i
xA\S¯2xS¯2∩A
=
∑
xS¯1∩(A\S¯2)
I
xS¯1∩(A\S¯2)
∑
xS¯2∩A
I
xS¯2∩A
X i
x(A\S¯2)\S¯1x(A\S¯2)∩S¯1xS¯2∩A
=
∑
x(S¯1∩(A\S¯2))∪(S¯2∩A)
I
x(S¯1∩(A\S¯2))∪(S¯2∩A)
X i
x(A\S¯2)\S¯1x(S¯1∩(A\S¯2))∪(S¯2∩A)
=
∑
xA∩(S¯1∪S¯1)
I
xA∩(S¯1∪S¯1)
X i
x(A\S¯2)\S¯1xA∩(S¯1∪S¯1)
=
∑
xA∩(S¯1∪S¯1)
I
xA∩(S¯1∪S¯1)
X i
xA\(S¯2∪S¯1)xA∩(S¯1∪S¯1)
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Each step is just a tedious exercise of keeping track of indices. The fifth line follows from
the fourth by noticing that (S¯1 ∩ (A\ S¯2))∪ (S¯2 ∩A) = A∩ (S¯1 ∪ S¯1). The sixth line follows
from the fifth by noticing that (A\ S¯2) \ S¯1 = A\ (S¯2 ∪ S¯1). Finally, we notice that the final
line is an element of
MS¯1∪S¯1
({
X i
xA
}
xA
)
as required.
C Proof of Corollary 4
Lemma 2 (indicators partition the sample space). Let IxS be the subset of Ω that is mapped
to 1 by the indicator IxS :
IxS = {ω : IxS (ω) = 1}
Then
1. ∪xSIxS = Ω
2. IxS ∩ Ix˜S = ∅ for all x
S 6= x˜S
Proof. For S = (1, 2, . . . , n) (i.e., when we are considering the statement applied to the
complete potential outcomes) both 1 and 2 follow simply from the properties of indicator
random variables. When S ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , n}, we note that since IxS =
∑
xS¯
Ix, we have that:
IxS = ∪xS¯Ix
Part 1 is now clear because
∪xSIxS = ∪xS ∪xS¯ Ix
= ∪xIx
Part 2 follows because of the distributivity of set operations and the fact that Ix ∩ Ix˜ = ∅.
Lemma 3 (identified subset of X i
xS
).
X i
xS
= IxS
Proof. Slightly abusing notation, let us write X i
x
= X i
xSxS¯
, where xS specifies the elements
of x indexed by S (and likewise for xS¯). We note that
X i
xS
(ω) ≡
∑
xS¯
I
xS¯
(ω)X i
xSxS¯
(ω)
=
∑
xS¯

∑
x˜
S
I
x˜
S
xS¯
(ω)

X i
xSxS¯
(ω)
=
∑
xS¯
∑
x˜
S
I
x˜
S
xS¯
(ω)X i
xSxS¯
(ω) (16)
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The above summation shows that X i
xS
is identified at ω iff there exists xˇS and xˇS¯ such
that I
xˇS xˇS¯
(ω) = 1 and X i
xSxS¯
is identified. For X i
xS xˇS¯
to be identified at ω, I
xS xˇS¯
(ω) = 1.
However, in the above double summation, exactly one of the I
x˜
S
xS¯
(ω) is equal to 1, with all
others are equal to 0. Therefore, the condition for identification of X i
xS
at ω is reduced to
the existence of xS¯ such that I
xSxS¯
(ω) = 1, which is true iff
∑
xS¯
I
xSxS¯
= 1, which is true
iff ω ∈ IxS , as required.
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